In this study we analyze which are the consequences of the euro interest rate movements over the interest rates in 16 markets outside euro zone during the current international financial crises period, in a framework of different exchange rate regimes. We adopted in our approach a methodology derived from the one used by Frankel et al. (2004) . We found that the sample countries do not develop an independent monetary policy in relation with ECB on the long run, but the results seem to confirm that there are differences on groups of countries (EU and non EU member) and due to heterogeneity of their exchange rate arrangements. Also, there are significant differences between the official declared exchange rate regimes and the real behavior of the monetary authority, especially those with pure floating exchange rate regimes. This could be a lesson for international banks with great exposure on CEE markets. The sensitivity of domestic interest rates of CEE countries to euro interest rates demonstrates a possible regional vulnerability.
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Introduction
In august 2007, burst one of the most severe crises known until today, with the epicenter in US economy. Europe has been stroked by the crises, as well. The recent turmoil on the international financial markets underlines the importance of contagion effect. Changes in interest rates in certain countries tend to have significant effects on other countries, especially on their banking systems. Under these conditions, some turbulence on certain monetary markets could be reflected in the evolution of interest rates on other countr markets. This could be an issue for the international strategic management of banks, especially multinational banks, which have exposure on different international markets. Banks have to deal with different market risks and to manage their assets and liabilities, making interest rates arbitrage (their international position allow them to draw resources from markets with low interest rates and to invest them on markets with higher interest rates). The international financial crisis may complicate their mission because of contagion effect that increases risks. Many international banks from Western Europe have established subsidiaries and branches in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries as consequences of globalization and increasing competition. Banks from Austria, Greece, France or Germany developed significant exposures in this part of Europe, being attracted by these emerging markets.
In this study we analyse which (if any) are the consequences of the euro interest rate movements over the interest rates in 16 CEE selected countries money markets outside euro zone, in a framework of different exchange rate regimes. We estimate whether the choice of exchange rate regime affects the sensitivity of local interest rates to euro (international) interest rates. We adopted in our approach a methodology derived from the one used by Frankel et al. (2004) . The importance and originality of this paper consist in assessing selected CEE countries outside euro zone (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Republic of Moldavia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Serbia and Turkey) in the current international financial crises period (September 2007 December 2010 .
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on the monetary independence hypothesis and interest rates transmission. In section 3 we explain the methodology we have used to investigate the consequences of the euro interest rate movements over the domestic interest rates in the selected countries and in section 4 we discuss the data. Section 5 is dedicated for presenting the results of the empirical analysis and discussion. In the final section, we conclude and make policy recommendations.
Literature review
exchange rates, domestic monetary autonomy and open capital markets all at once. The monetary independence hypothesis originated with Fleming (1962) , Mundell (1963 Mundell ( , 1964 , and Dornbusch (1976) models, argues that flexible exchange rates allow countries to pursue independent monetary policies and the domestic interest rate should be less sensitive to changes in international interest rates other things equal. By the contrast, under pegged exchange rates and unrestricted capital flows, domestic interest rates cannot be set independently, but rather must track closely those prevailing in the country to which the domestic currency is pegged. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) were among the first who emploied open economy macroeconomic models.
There are many empirical regional and single country studies that research on the degree of monetary autonomy of central banks in the framework of capital markets liberalization and the choice of exchange rate regimes. Cumby and Obstfeld (1981) showed that the Mexican central bank had considerable shortrun control over domestic credit conditions under a fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s, although at a cost of high reserve volatilities. Hausmann et al. (1999) , studying exchange rate regimes in Latin America, discovered that flexible exchange rate regimes did not permit more stabilizing monetary policy and that pro-cyclical monetary measures were actually supported by flexible exchange rate regimes. Flood and Rose (1995) and Rose (1996) , examining trade-offs between exchange rate volatility and measures of monetary divergence, found either no support or weak support for the trade-offs implied by the trilemma. Frankel (1998) concludes that countries having floating or intermediate regimes (i.e., Mexico after 1994 and Brazil before mid-1998), exhibit much higher interest rate responses than countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes (i.e. Argentina, Hong Kong or Panama). Borensztein et al. (2001) , focusing on some countries with currency boards or floating regimes (such as those in Argentina, Mexico, Hong Kong, and Singapore), found some evidence consistent with the traditional view. Bluedorn and Bowdler (2010) compare international interest rate responses under pegged and nonpegged regimes to identified, unanticipated, and exogenous U.S. interest rate changes and realized U.S. interest rate changes. They found important differences in estimated transmission from the two sets of measures -identified interest rate changes demonstrate a greater concordance with the impossible trinity than realized rate changes. Miniane and Rogers (2007) identify U.S. interest rate shocks from structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) and estimate their transmission to a range of foreign interest rates. Shambaugh (2004) reports evidence that a peg imposes a constraint on monetary policy in the form of higher interest rate pass-through. By contrast, Frankel et al. (2004) find that full interest rate pass-through cannot be rejected in many cases, even for non-pegs. They use different exchange rate regime classifications in their estimation. Reinhart (2000, 2002) argue that under the modern float there could be limited monetary autonomy. Bordo and Flandreau (2003) discovered that even under the classical gold standard domestic monetary autonomy was considerable. Obstfeld et. al (2004) found that the interest rates of pegged economies react more to changes in the base rate; the base rate can explain more of the changes in the local rate for pegs; also, the pegs react more quickly and have a stronger long run relationship to the base than non-pegs do. Their studies cover a period over more than 130 years. Fratzscher (2002) analyzes the trade-off between exchange rate flexibility and monetary policy autonomy for a group consisting of open emerging market countries and countries under the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), finding no systematic link between exchange rate flexibility and monetary independence.
There are few studies that research on monetary autonomy of central banks from Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries or EU new member states. Comparative analysis including CEE countries does not find a clear pattern for interest rate response to external factors according to different exchange rate systems. Also, the samples countries were not too comprehensive. Habib (2002) investigates the impact of external factors on daily exchange rates and short-term interest rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The conclusions are that exchange rates and interest rates are not influenced by short-term German interest rates. However, shocks to emerging market risk premia do have an impact on exchange rates in these three countries. Crespo Cuaresma and Wojcik (2006) estimate using a Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) multivariate GARCH model, the degree of time-varying correlation in interest rate shocks with Germany and the U.S. under different exchange rates regimes for three new EU member countries Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland. They find that the dynamic behavior of the correlations in interest rate shocks in the Czech Republic appear to be consistent with theory, but they demonstrate no evidence to support the validity of the monetary hypothesis in Hungary and Poland. Scheicher (2000) finds that short-term interest rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are segmented at a regional and at a global level and do not interact with the benchmark rate in Germany during the period 1997-98. Darvas and Szapary (1999) , including Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in a sample of emerging economies, consider impossible to differentiate interest rate responses to external shocks according to the National Bank of Romania (NBR) after adopting a managed floating exchange rate regime on August 2005 and find that the effect of euro interest rate changes on the local interest rate seems to be higher than expected.
Methodology
Our intent is to establish the extent of monetary policy independence in the selected European countries, members and non-members of the European Union. To highlight the empirical regularities regarding the link between their domestic interest rates and the euro interest rate, we estimate a simple linear model on a panel data series, as follows: ( 1 ) where: r d i,t domestic nominal interest rate for the local currency of country i at time t; r e t foreign (euro) interest rate at time t; I i,t inflation differential for country i at time t (control variable); f i country i specific effect; i,t error term for country i at time t. This equation describes the longparameter is our main focus and shows the sensitivity of the domestic interest rate to euro interest rate movements. The specification includes the inflation differential (domestic versus euro area) as a control variable. This is a proxy for the variation of the currency risk premium and/or country risk premium, which may determine the cross-country and time variation of the interest rates (Frankel et al., 2004) .
The average level of the domestic interest rate may be determined as an average of the countryspecific effects, f i (not accounting for the euro interest rate and the control variable), as follows:
There is evidence of possible heteroscedastic and serially correlated OLS residuals and, as a consequence, the standard estimation methods may not be employed. We use a IV cross-section fixed-effects estimation on the panel countries, with a Newey-West estimator, robust against heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The methodology is based on a three step empirical research.
We estimate the specification (1) on the whole sample, on subsamples divided by exchange rate regimes and on subsamples selected by the EU membership status and the exchange rate regime respectively.
The need to deepen our analysis by breaking the data in three regime subsamples is due to the various exchange rate arrangements adopted by the selected countries and the evidence that the country effects are different for each regime type. We are also interested in highlighting the particularities of the monetary policy transmission mecanisms in the EU member countries versus the non-members from CEE.
For the current paper we grouped the countries in three broad regime types fixed(pegged), intermediate and floating depending on the flexibility of the regime, similarly to the Frankel et al. (2004) approach, but the difference is that we employed two different classification approaches, for the robustness check of the model de-jure exchange rate regimes and the de facto exchange rate policy implemented by monetary authorities. These classifications reflect different aspects of the exchange rate policy. As Harms and Kretschmann (2009: p. 140) a distinction is important since, on the one hand, many countries tolerated and still tolerate the existence of parallel foreign exchange markets, and in these countries the stability of the official exchange rate often two widely used in the literature exchange rate regime classifications the IMF de jure approach and the Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) (5) Pre announced crawling peg (6) Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (7) De factor crawling peg (8) De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (9) Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% (10) De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5% (11) Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time) (12) Managed floating Three main factors determine the extent of domestic and foreign interest rates close correlation (Frankel et al., 2004) : the degree of financial integration of the domestic economy into world market, the degree of business cycles synchronization and the nature of shocks. Assuming a given level of these factors, the economic theory states that a higher degree of exchange rate flexibility should allow a higher degree of monetary policy independence (Hanke, 2008) . The foreign shocks are absorbed especially by the domestic currency exchange rate as long as the flexibility of the exchange rate is higher. Thereby a country with a flexible exchange rate regime has a low sensitivity of the domestic interest rates to the euro (foreign) interest rates (and vicepeg intermediate float peg float <1. However the floating regime interest sensitivity may equal or even exceed unity in a situation when monetary authorities choose the same monetary policy rule as the world at large (or a region) and the countries face common shocks or correlated business cycles.
This may be our case, as our panel data contains countries that are EU members heading towards EMU and others that have economies strongly linked to the EU, so the monetary policies may be closely following the European Central Bank policy.
Data
Our primary source of data is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but we also downloaded data from the internet sites of the Albanian and Macedonian Central Banks. The monthly data sample period is from September 2007, the begining of the financial crises in Europe, to December 2010.
We use the IFS 60BZF monthly series of the money market rates (3 months maturity) in Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Turkey and euro area. As the 60BZF series are not available for Hungary and Montenegro, we use the 60CZF monthly series of the 3 months -Treasury bill rate instead. The monthly data for Albania and Macedonia are complied from the daily series of 3-month money market rates, available on their respective central banks sites.
As a control variable, we use the inflation differential calculated as a log difference of the domestic versus euro area consumer price index, available in the IFS database.
All interest rates and inflation rates are expressed as continuous compounded variables r = 100% * ln(1+R), where R=10% is expressed as 0.10.
The de jure de jure classification system, introduced by the Fund in 1999 and available in rrangements and (AREAR). The de facto exchange rate arrangements dataset (Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010) was kindly provided to us by Carmen Reinhart. It seems that the floating exchange arragements are virtually missing in CEE countries in the selected period, according to the latter classification (only 4 observations).
Results and discussion
In our estimations, f -value from the Wald 1. In the Table 1 , we show the results for all panel data and for the regime subsamples. We can notice that all the estimations are significantly different from zero. The slope coefficient estimate for the entire sample is 0.638 and is not significantly different from unity, which suggests that, during current international financial crises, the panel countries do not develop an independent monetary policy versus the European Central Bank (ECB) on the long run. We can also conclude that there is an interest rate transmission from euro money market to CEE money markets, even , that could induce a possible contagion effect in case of financial turbulence. If we consider the estimation on exchange rate regime subsamples, we can observe that the conventional wisdom is not confirmed: the point estimate of the slope value is higher under intermediate regimes (0.683) than under pegged regimes (0.405), but both estimates are significantly different from unity. In the case of floating exchange rate regime, the point estimate of the slope value is higher, but statistically not different from one (1.173), suggesting a full transmision of interest rates. The results seem to confirm that there are differences due to heterogeneity of the exchange rate arrangements in the selected countries. In the case of pegged exchange rate regime, the value of the slope may be due to some lack of capital mobility or because monetary authorities actions are not consonant with the announced de jure exchange rate regimes. The former argument could be valid for the results on floating exchange regime sample, as well. Table 2 shows the results for the subsamples of EU member countries and non EU member countries. All results are statistically different from zero. We can observe that in the case of non EU member countries, the transmission is much more evident than in EU member countries, but the slope estimates are statistically different from unity for both. If we consider the subsamples grouped by countries and exchange rate regimes we have the following results: in the case of EU countries pegged > floating > intermediate, all slopes being statistically different from one; in the case of non EU member countries floating intermediate > pegged , the conventional wisdom about the estimated values of is not being confirmed. More than that, the slope estimation for non EU countries is negative and statistically greater than one, showing an inverse correlation between the euro and the domestic interest rates. There are interesting results for non EU countries intermediate regime, as well, suggesting a full transmission of euro interest rates, the slope being virtually equal to one, and for non EU countries floating regime, where we can find an over adjustment of the domestic interest rates, because the slope estimates are statistically different and greater than one. According to Frankel et al (2004) this may be due to the fact that domestic monetary authorities follow the same monetary rules and/or share a high degree of business cycles synchronization over the sample period and/or because of the financial crises effect. We next perform a robustness checks on these results, adopting the alternative (de facto) exchange rate regime classification proposed by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) . According to this classification, there is no de facto floating exchange rate regime in the sample period. This could explain the distorted results from the previous estimations. If we consider the estimation regime subsamples, the conventional wisdom is confirmed: the point estimate of the slope value is higher under pegged regimes (0.833) than under intermediate regimes (0.569), and almost equal to one. By splitting the sample in EU member countries and non EU member countries, we obtain the same results as with IMF de jure exchange rate regimes: all results are statistically different from zero and in case of non EU member countries the transmission is much more evident than in EU member countries, but for both the slope estimates are statistically different from unity. Considering the subsamples grouped by countries and exchange rate regime we find that the conventional wisdom is confirmed in the case of EU member countries : pegged floating and pegged statistically almost equal to one. The slope value estimations for non EU member countries with pegged regimes are not statistically significant, but however there are not sufficient observations to validate the results. 
Conclusion
In this research we analyze which are the consequences of the euro interest rate movements over the money market interest rates in selected CEE countries during the current financial crises. We find that the sample countries do not develop an independent monetary policy in relation with ECB on the long run, but the results seem to confirm that there are differences on groups of countries (EU and non EU members) and due to heterogeneity of their exchange rate arrangements. In the non-EU member countries case, the interest rates are more sensitive to euro interest rates than in EU member countries. There are also significant differences between the official declared exchange rate regimes (de jure) and the real behavior of the monetary authority (de facto). This kind of differences were confirmed before by an extensive literature on the link between the regime classification and various macroeconomic variables. The de facto classification seams to deliver results for the EU countries that are consistent to the conventional wisdom. For the non-EU countries there is a single valid result for the de facto arrangements -intermediate. However, the sensitivity of domestic interest rates of CEE countries to euro interest rates demonstrates a possible regional vulnerability. This could be a lesson for international banks with great exposure on CEE markets. In the case of financial turbulences in euro zone, the CEE countries could be significantly affected. It is advisable to readjust international bank positions and to reorient to other international markets, where the current financial crises was less present, as some Spanish banks did through expanding their activity in Latin America. We also recommend that international banks involved on CEE markets should rather be concerned of maintaining their solvability, than maintaining or increasing market shares.
an an (McCauley et al, 2002) , obtaining resources on local markets.
ECB should be aware of its monetary policy decisions implication on the region. Supervision and regulation authority should also be more concern subsidiaries, especially those with large exposure on their markets.
